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The Backwards Arrow of Time of the Coherently Bayesian Statistical Mechanic
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University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA∗
Many physicists think that the maximum entropy formalism is a straightforward application of
Bayesian statistical ideas to statistical mechanics. Some even say that statistical mechanics is just
the general Bayesian logic of inductive inference applied to large mechanical systems. This approach
identifies thermodynamic entropy with the information-theoretic uncertainty of an (ideal) observer’s
subjective distribution over a system’s microstates. In this brief note, I show that this postulate, plus
the standard Bayesian procedure for updating probabilities, implies that the entropy of a classical
system is monotonically non-increasing on the average — the Bayesian statistical mechanic’s arrow of
time points backwards. Avoiding this unphysical conclusion requires rejecting the ordinary equations
of motion, or practicing an incoherent form of statistical inference, or rejecting the identification of
uncertainty and thermodynamic entropy.
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Recent years have seen renewed interest in connections
between physics and statistics [1]. Of particular inter-
est, naturally, has been the connection between statisti-
cal mechanics and statistical inference. The subjectivist
approach to statistical mechanics, ably advocated in re-
cent times by Jaynes [2] and his school, holds that prob-
abilities represent degrees of belief; specifically, the prob-
ability of a microstate is the degree to which an ideal
observer should believe the system is in that state, given
the evidence available, and the entropy of the system
is that observer’s uncertainty as to the microstate. The
theory governing the coherent use of subjective probabili-
ties is called Bayesian statistics [3]. Jaynes, in particular,
claimed that statistical mechanics is just an application
of the general logic of Bayesian inference. The validity
of statistical mechanics would then be independent of
such tricky dynamical properties as ergodicity, mixing,
etc., which on other interpretations are vital. For sub-
jectivists, the intensive study of the ergodic properties of
mechanical systems is simply time wasted.
While controversial [4], the Bayesian vision of statis-
tical mechanics is powerful and appealing. However, it
has a flaw which has not been pointed out before. The
second law says that the entropy of a closed system is
non-decreasing; this provides the arrow of time. In §I, I
prove that, equating thermodynamic entropy with sub-
jective uncertainty, ordinary Bayesian inference implies
that entropy is non-increasing over time, at least on av-
erage and sometimes strictly. (§I A investigates the long-
run behavior of the distribution under Bayesian updat-
ing; it is ancillary to the main line of argument.) This
is completely unphysical, so §II examines the proof’s as-
sumptions. There are strong arguments that any coher-
ent use of subjective probabilities must employ Bayesian
updating. In any case, replacing it by repeated applying
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the maximum entropy principle still reverses the arrow of
time. This forces a choice between inconsistent, ad hoc
rules of statistical inference, or abandoning the equation
of physical entropy with uncertainty.
This rest of this introduction fixes notation, following
[5, 6], and makes explicit some innocent assumptions.
Start with a classical mechanical system with a phase
space Γ; write x for a point in this phase space. F is a
distribution on Γ, representing an (ideal) observer’s un-
certainty about the microscopic state s. For simplicity,
assume this distribution has a density f (i.e., is abso-
lutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure on
Γ). Denote expectation by angle brackets, so the mean
ofM is 〈M〉; subscripts will specify the distribution used
in the expectation when necessary, i.e. 〈M〉F is the mean
of M under distribution F . 〈M |N〉 is the expectation of
M conditional on N .
The system’s equations of motion lead to a discrete-
time evolution operator T on Γ, which I will assume is
non-singular. (Everything still works in continuous time,
but needs more symbols.) By a slight abuse of notation,
T also denotes the induced Frobenius-Perron operator
taking distributions on Γ into new distributions on Γ.
The specification of T also induces an evolution opera-
tor for observables, the Koopman operator U , such that
Uφ(x) = φ(T (x)) for any sufficiently well-behaved (L∞)
function φ. From this definition, it can be seen that
〈Uφ〉F = 〈φ〉TF . (The difference between the Frobenius-
Perron and Koopman operators is like that between the
Schro¨dinger and Heisenberg pictures, respectively.)
There is, in addition to the microscopic degrees of free-
dom, a set of macroscopic degrees of freedom, collectively
M . These observables depend only on the present micro-
scopic state, though possibly noisily, through some ob-
servation density p(M = m|X = x).
Write F0 for the initial distribution, and Ft for the
distribution at time t. The distribution F0 may be de-
rived via a maximum-entropy procedure, starting from
an initial observation M(0) = m0 [2]. However, it re-
2ally doesn’t matter where F0 comes from, or what form
it takes. Finally, write H [F ] for the Shannon entropy of
the distribution F , i.e.,
H [F ] ≡ −
∫
Γ
f(x) log f(x)dx (1)
The information content of a random variable X is de-
fined to be the entropy of its distribution function, which
for convenience will also be written H [X ]; it should al-
ways be clear which is meant. Conditional information
content, H [X |Y = y], is the entropy of the conditional
distribution.
I. DERIVATION OF THE BACKWARDS
ARROW
So far, I have either been fixing notation, or making
assumptions which are common to all approaches to sta-
tistical mechanics, and so presumably innocuous. I now
make three explicit and substantive assumptions.
I The evolution operator T is invertible.
II The probability distribution over mi-
crostates gets updated by the usual appli-
cation of Bayes’s rule, p(X = x|Y = y) =
p(Y = y|X = x)p(X = x)/p(Y = y).
III The thermodynamic entropy at time t, St, is
equal to H [Ft].
These assumptions reverse the arrow of time, i.e., they
make entropy non-increasing.
Begin with the initial distribution over microstates, F0.
After one time step, this is transformed to a new distri-
bution, TF0. From a Bayesian perspective, this does not
represent a change in our knowledge of the system, merely
keeping our predictions up to date. (Rather than updat-
ing the distribution, we could use the Koopman operator
to update observables.) It is a well-known consequence
of assumption I that H [TF0] = H [F0], i.e., that con-
servative dynamics are entropy-preserving [5, Theorem
9.3.1]. However, we now make a new measurement of the
macroscopic observable M , getting the value m1. Then,
via assumption II, Bayes’s rule gives us a new distribu-
tion:
f1(x) =
p(m1|x)Tf0(x)∫
Γ
p(m1|x)Tf0(x)dx
(2)
Now, f1(x) is simply the density of X1, conditional on
M1 = m1. So H [F1] = H [X1|M1 = m1]. An elemen-
tary inequality of information theory [6] tells us that
“conditioning reduces entropy”; specifically, H [X |M ] =
〈H [X |M = m]〉 ≤ H [X ], with equality if and only if X
and M are statistically independent. Using assumption
III to identify the thermodynamic entropy St and the
Shannon information H [Ft],
〈S1〉 = 〈H [F1]〉 ≤ H [F0] = S0 (3)
Thus, unless the macroscopic observable is in fact merely
noise, the entropy decreases on average. While there may
be values of m which are so uninformative they increase
an observer’s uncertainty about the microscopic state, on
average every observation helps narrow that uncertainty.
A stronger result follows from the common idealiza-
tion that observables are deterministic functions of mi-
croscopic state, M(x) = m. In this case, p(m|x) is ei-
ther 0 or 1, depending on whether M(x) = m1 or not.
Thus f1(x) = Tf0(x)1M−1(m1)(x)/TF0(M
−1(m1)), i.e.,
the truncation of TF0 to the part of Γ compatible with
the macroscopic observation. Unless M−1(m1) includes
the entire support of TF0, F1 is a more concentrated
measure than TF0 or F0, and so the entropy has strictly
decreased, and not just on average.1
Under repeated measurements, the entropy is non-
increasing, either on average or strictly, depending on
whether the measurements are noisy or not. (Entropy is
constant between observations.) In the case of discrete-
valued deterministic measurements, if the measurement
partition is “generating” [7, 8], then the volume of Γ com-
patible with a sequence of measurements shrinks towards
zero, and so the uncertainty, as measured by the Shan-
non information, tends to −∞. This is not necessarily
the case if the measurement partition is not generating.
Note that I required nothing of the dynamics other
than assumption I, invertibility. In particular, I did not
need chaos, ergodicity, mixing, etc., either at the micro-
scopic or macroscopic level. Thermodynamic equilibrium
or its absence is also irrelevant.
A. Long-Run Behavior of H [Ft]
Describing the long-run behavior of H [Ft] requires ex-
plicit use of measure-theoretic probability [9], and what’s
called “Doob’s martingale”. As a measurable space, Γ
comes with a σ-algebra of measurable sets G. Let G
be any set in G. Then 1G(X) is a random variable, in-
dicating whether or not X ∈ G, and 〈1G〉F0 = F (G),
the probability of the set G under distribution F0. Let
Mt = σ(M1, . . .Mt), the smallest σ-algebra with respect
to which all the observables up toMt are measurable, and
examine 〈1G|Mt〉F0 , the conditional expectation of the
indicator variable for G. Clearly, 〈1G|Mt〉F0 = 〈1G〉Ft =
Ft(G). Ft(G) is a martingale and converges almost surely
and in mean square to a random variable F∞(G), which is
the conditional expectation of 1G with respect to M∞,
the smallest σ-algebra containing all the Mt [9, §6.6].
Thus, the conditional measures Ft converge weakly on
a limit F∞ [9, §7.1]. Thus, the entropy of H [Ft] also
1 The most important case where supp TF0 ⊆ M−1(m1) is when
M is a constant of the motion, e.g., total energy for a Hamilto-
nian system. Entropy is then constant after the first measure-
ment, even if the system begins arbitrarily far from equilibrium.
3converges on a limiting value. IfM∞ = G, as in the gen-
erating partition case, then, for any set G, F∞(G) = 0
or = 1, and H [F∞] = −∞. If M∞ ⊂ G, then the con-
ditional distributions converge weakly on a distribution
with a finite entropy.2
A somewhat more refined result is possible if we as-
sume that the asymptotic equipartition property of infor-
mation theory holds (i.e., that the Shannon-Macmillan-
Breiman theorem applies). This leads to estimates of
the asymptotic growth rates for likelihoods, and so for
posterior probabilities in Bayes’s rule.
Suppose that the following limits exist for every x, y ∈
Γ:
h(x)
≡ lim
1
n
H [Mn|Mn−1,Mn−2 . . .M1, X0 = x] (4)
= − lim
1
n
∫
dnm p(mn1 |x) log p(m
n
1 |x) (5)
d(x, y)
≡ lim
1
n
∫
dnm p(mn1 |y) log
p(mn1 |x)
p(mn1 |y)
(6)
where p(mn1 |x) abbreviates p(M1 = m1,M2 =
m2, . . .Mn = mn|X0 = x). The quantity h(x) is
the macroscopic entropy rate at x (not to be con-
fused with the microscopic rate of entropy produc-
tion [10]). d(x, y) is the macroscopic relative entropy
rate, or Kullback-Leibler divergence rate, between x
and y. Note that d(x, y) ≥ 0, and that d(x, y) = 0
if and only if p(Mn = mn|M
n−1
1 = m
n−1
1 , X0 = y) and
p(Mn = mn|M
n−1
1 , X0 = x) converge for almost all m
n
1
[11]. Further assume that the asymptotic equipartition
property [11] holds, so that, if X0 = y, then for F0-
almost-all x
lim−
1
n
log p(mn1 |x) = h(y) + d(x, y) (7)
almost surely. An immediate corollary of Eq. 7 is that
log p(mn1 |x) = −nh(y)− nd(x, y) + g(x, y,m
n
1 ) (8)
where g is a random quantity which is o(n) almost surely.
Write Bayes’s rule with n observations in logarithmic
form, and substitute in Eq. 8 (assuming f0(x) > 0):
log
fn(x)
f0(x)
= log p(mn1 |x) − log 〈p(m
n
1 |x)〉F0 (9)
= −nh(y)− nd(x, y) + g(x, y,mn1 )
− log
〈
e−nh(y)−nd(x,y)+g(x,y,m
n
1
)
〉
F0
(10)
2 By Eq. 3, the sequence H[Ft] forms a supermartingale with
respect to the filtration induced by the macro-variables Mt, but
the conditions needed to directly apply martingale convergence
theorems, such as 〈|H[Ft]|〉 < ∞, do not necessarily hold.
= −nh(y)− nd(x, y) + g(x, y,mn1 )
− log e−nh(y)
〈
e−nd(x,y)eg(x,y,m
n
1
)
〉
F0
(11)
= −nd(x, y) + g(x, y,mn1 )− γ(y,m
n
1 )
− log
〈
e−nd(x,y)
〉
F0
(12)
γ is another o(n) random quantity; for later use, set
η(x, y,mn1 ) = g(x, y,m
n
1 )− γ(y,m
n
1 ).
log
〈
e−nd(x,y)
〉
F0
= log
∫
dxf0(x)
(
e−d(x,y)
)n
(13)
= log
(∥∥∥e−d(x,y)
∥∥∥n
F0
)n
(14)
= n log
∥∥∥e−d(x,y)
∥∥∥n
F0
(15)
= −ndn(y) (16)
The last line defines dn(y), and ‖φ(x)‖
n
F ≡
(〈|φ(x)|
n
〉F )
1/n
is the Ln norm of the function φ
with respect to the measure F [9]. The latter is non-
decreasing in n, and its limit is the essential supremum
of the function. That is,
∥∥e−d(x,y)∥∥∞
F0
is the smallest
u such that u ≥ e−d(x,y) for all x, except on a set
of F0-probability zero. It follows that d∞(y) is the
essential infimum of d(x, y), and so d∞(y) ≤ d(x, y)
everywhere except on a set of F0-probability zero. Since
d(x, y) ≥ 0, we can be sure that d∞(y) is at least zero.
Since d(y, y) = 0, if f0 is positive in every sufficiently
small neighborhood of y, we will have d∞(y) = 0. Since
the procedures used to construct prior distributions for
statistical mechanics generally give non-vanishing weight
to all physically accessible regions of the phase space,
this last assumption is reasonable, and so set d∞(y) = 0.
Substituting back in to Eq. 12,
log
fn(x)
f0(x)
= −nd(x, y) + η(x, y,mn1 ) + ndn(y) (17)
= n(dn(y)− d(x, y)) + η(x, y,m
n
1 ) (18)
Taking the limit as n→∞,
lim
1
n
log
fn(x)
f0(x)
= d∞(y)− d(x, y) (19)
= −d(x, y) (20)
Asymptotically, therefore, fn(x) shrinks exponentially
fast towards zero, unless d(x, y) = 0. Setting D(y) =
{x |d(x, y) = 0}, we see that F∞(D(y)) = 1, and so
H [F∞] is at most the logarithm of the volume of D(y).
II. WAYS TO AVOID THIS RESULT
Since, in reality, thermodynamic entropy is monoton-
ically non-decreasing, at least one of the assumptions
leading to Eq. 3 must be wrong.
4A. Assumption I: Invertible Dynamics
Denying assumption I “has all the advantages of theft
over honest toil” [12]. The problem of the foundations of
statistical mechanics is precisely that of deriving macro-
scopic irreversibility from microscopically-reversible dy-
namics, and the point of the Bayesian approach was to
do so with making detailed assumptions about those dy-
namics. That said, crime may not pay; the conditions
needed to get H [TF ] ≥ H [F ] impose highly non-trivial
restrictions on the dynamics [13]. Not only are conser-
vative Hamiltonian dynamics ruled out, but so is any
system of ordinary differential equations. What is re-
ally needed is that H [TF |M ] ≥ H [F ], and it is hard to
see why the microscopic dynamics should always produce
more than enough entropy to off-set the information pro-
vided by whichever macroscopic observables we happen
to choose. But without such cancellation, watching a pot
closely enough will keep it from boiling.
B. Assumption II: Bayesian Updating
Explicitly or not, most advocates of Bayesian statisti-
cal mechanics reject assumption II [4, 14]. For instance,
Jaynes put forward the following derivation of the sec-
ond law [2]: Start with an initial observation of an ob-
servable, M0 = m0. Confine ourselves to distributions
ρ which have 〈M〉ρ = m0; call the set of such distribu-
tions C0. Let the member of C0 with the highest entropy
be J0; we select this as our initial distribution. Now let
it evolve forward in time, giving TJ0; by assumption I,
H [J0] = H [TJ0]. The time evolution leads to a certain
value for the observable, m1 = 〈M〉TJ0 . Now consider
the class of distributions C1 with 〈M〉ρ = m1; let the
maximum entropy member of this class be J1. Since
TJ0 ∈ C1, it follows that H [J1] ≥ H [TJ0] = H [J0].
Jaynes then identifies S1 with H [J1], i.e., he updates the
distribution by re-applying the maximum entropy prin-
ciple, using only the current observation, rather than by
applying Bayes’s rule.
There are good reasons to doubt the wisdom of using
probability as a measure of degree of belief [15]. But if
you are going to do that, then the Bayesian way is the
right way to do so, and you need to use conditioning.
Failure to do so is incoherent, as the well-known “Dutch
Book” arguments show. ([16] gives a clear introduction;
see [3] for details.) In particular, in the formally very
similar problem of nonlinear filtering [17], application of
Bayes’s rule is demonstrably optimal, and forgetting all
earlier observations is not, regardless of whether one in-
terprets probability subjectively.3
3 The doubts raised by [18] about inter-temporal updating are not
relevant. There’s no time lapse between TF0 and F1, just the
addition of the information that M1 = m1.
Even if Bayesian statistical mechanics are free to not
use conditioning, they still get a backwards arrows of
time. A consistent use of the principle of maximum en-
tropy, given the two observations M0 = m0 and M1 =
m1, would go as follows. First, restrict ourselves to distri-
butions ρ which satisfy both the constraints 〈M〉ρ = m0
and 〈M〉Tρ = m1. It is awkward to have one constraint
on ρ and another on Tρ; using the Koopman operator,
we can turn the latter into a constraint on ρ as well,
〈UM〉ρ = m1. Let us write C01 for the class of distribu-
tions satisfying these two constraints. Those satisfying
the first constraint are the class we called C0 above, and
those satisfying the second constraint form a subclass of
the set we called C1 above. Hence C01 ⊆ C0 ∩ C1. Then
the maximum entropy principle tells us to pick the dis-
tribution J01 given by
J01 = arg max
ρ∈C01
H [ρ] (21)
Since C01 ⊆ C0 and C01 ⊆ C1, it is clear that H [J01] ≤
minH [J0], H [J1]. Thus, updating our distribution by
maximizing entropy, rather than conditioning, still re-
verses the arrow of time: by assumption III, S1 =
H [TJ01], and by assumption I, H [TJ01] = H [J01] ≤
H [J0] = S0.
To avoid getting the direction of the arrow of time
backwards, the Bayesian or Jaynesian statistical me-
chanic must ignore the known prior history, a procedure
quite without statistical justification. By use of the op-
erator U , constraints on a single observable over multiple
times can be converted into constraints on multiple ob-
servables at a single time, which we are normally told
must all be incorporated into the distribution F . There
does not seem to be any reason why it should be legiti-
mate to take M as a constraint in the maximum entropy
procedure, but not UM . Worse yet, under some cir-
cumstances subjectivists (e.g., Jaynes, in his discussion
of spin-echo experiments [2, 4]) have been explicit about
needing to incorporate historical information in order to
avoid unphysical predictions.
Whether we update via conditioning, or by applying
the maximum entropy principle, we get unphysical re-
sults for the entropy, and can avoid them only by incon-
sistency about whether historical data counts, or, equiv-
alently, whether all observables must inform the postu-
lated distribution. One might argue that, for most sys-
tems of interest, the distribution obtained from applying
the maximum entropy principle only to ordinary observ-
ables at the current time leads to nearly the same predic-
tions as the coherent procedures, but the former is much
easier to calculate than the latter, particularly if the dy-
namics are very irregular. In such a case, the complexity
of computing the nth iterate of the evolution operator,
T n, may grow rapidly with n, so that a computationally-
limited agent, acting under time pressure, might prefer
an approximation which neglects historical data to an
exact but intractable update. The validity of such an ap-
proximation would depend on the ergodic properties of
5the dynamics (e.g., mixing), and it is precisely to avoid
such dependence that the Bayesian approach was intro-
duced. Worse, it would lead to a novel kind of Maxwell’s
demon, a purely passive observer who can make the en-
tropy decrease during a time interval which depends on
the observer’s processing speed and the time-complexity
of computing T n. In any event, none of this would ex-
plain why the thermodynamic entropy should match the
entropy of this approximate distribution.
C. Assumption III: Thermodynamic Entropy Is
Subjective Uncertainty
Assumption III is that thermodynamic entropy S is the
information-theoretic uncertainty H [F ]. Denying this
seems to me a completely satisfactory option. Macro-
scopically, entropy is defined by its relations to the ob-
servables of heat and temperature. Microscopically, as-
suming the usual representation of phase space, entropy
is the logarithm of the volume in phase space compatible
with the current macroscopic state [19, 20, 21]; more gen-
erally, it is the logarithm of the measure of that region
[22, 23].
Rejection of assumption III is perfectly compatible
with accepting a Bayesian, subjectivist interpretation of
probability.
III. CONCLUSION
A backwards arrow of time follows directly from the
combination of assumptions I, II and III, at least one of
which must therefore be rejected. Rejecting assumption
I, invertible microphysical dynamics, entails considerable
modification of basic physics. Rejecting assumption II,
updating subjective probabilities via Bayes’s rule, is ac-
tually insufficient; one must also reject the principle of
maximum entropy, or at the very least apply it in an in-
coherent way, sometimes taking into account all observa-
tional constraints, sometimes not. Rejecting assumption
III, the identification of thermodynamic entropy with the
Shannon information H [F ], seems to lead to the least
trouble. I do not pretend that only one choice among
these alternatives is defensible, but some choice is neces-
sary.
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